I’m a third-year Ph.D. student in Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of Maryland, College Park.
My research lies at the intersection of labor economics and political economy. I study how institutional design and technology shape political representation, labor market access, and resource distribution in low-capacity settings.
Abstract: Can local democracy in areas of weak state capacity attract competent leaders while ensuring representation of disadvantaged groups? Using linked census and electoral data on nearly 1 million local politicians and 95 million rural residents in Bihar, we find that the system functions as a “partially exclusive meritocracy”: politicians come from elite backgrounds, and within those, the more educated tend to win. This produces a trade-off—candidates from disadvantaged groups are more representative but less educated and connected. Institutional factors like inequality, party presence, and caste diversity shape but do not overturn this pattern. However, policy reforms can shift selection: financial devolution increases candidate entry; gender quotas bring in less wealthy households; and caste quotas reduce competence but enhance representativeness. Close-election RDDs show more competent winners are better informed and more connected, and a conjoint experiment reveals that voters favor educated candidates. We highlight new insights into political selection in low-capacity democracies.
Abstract: Many organizations expand teams to improve efficiency, yet the effects on performance remain unclear. I develop a theoretical model showing that the impact of team expansion depends on diversity, which influences credit attribution and individual incentives. To test this, I leverage exogenous variation in council size and composition in West Bengal’s local governance. A regression discontinuity design reveals that expansion reduces infrastructure development, but only in homogeneous councils. In diverse councils, the effects are negligible or positive. Consistent with the model, homogeneous councils also exhibit lower electoral competition, suggesting weaker incentives. These findings underscore the role of diversity in shaping the effects of team expansion.
Abstract: The rise of gig economy platforms has sparked debate on whether algorithmic hiring practices mitigate or exacerbate gender pay disparities. Using data from a leading Indian job portal, we document that algorithmic bias reinforces existing gender wage gaps—employers offer lower salaries to women, and the platform’s algorithm systematically recommends lower-paying jobs to them. To address this, we conduct a randomized experiment modifying the platform’s wage suggestion algorithm. Employers nudged by the revised algorithm offered higher salaries to female workers without increasing hiring requirements, and treated vacancies attracted higher-quality applicants. Our findings demonstrate how small algorithmic adjustments can mitigate pay disparities in digital labor markets.